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Episode #1. Tundu Lissu’s “Tutakinukisha (Ignite it): ‘No Reform, no Election’” Speech of 3 April 2025.

Nicodemus MINDE & Marie-Aude FOUÉRÉ, “Episode #1. Tundu Lissu’s “Tutakinukisha (Ignite it): ‘No Reform, no Election’” Speech of 3 April 2025.” Mambo! no. 106, 2026

Tindu Lissu at the High Court, Dar es Salaam, 20 February 2026; courtesy of Chadema X account

On 21 January 2025, Tundu Lissu defeated Freeman Mbowe in the internal elections of CHADEMA (Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo, Party of Democracy and Development) and became the new party’s chairman. Two burning questions immediately arose: Would the party survive this change from Mbowe, a seasoned politician at the helm of the party for over twenty years and promoter of the political status quo, to Lissu, known to be a radical and uncompromising leader (Minde, 2024)? And how would the long-standing ruling CCM party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Party of the Revolution), within an authoritarian one-party system (Makulilo, 2008; Paget, 2019), react to it?

Under Mbowe, CHADEMA became the main opposition party in Tanzania by building strong grassroots support at the national level. This was a big achievement under an entrenched one-party state. With Lissu’s victory and the new men in charge, among them John Heche (Vice Chairperson), John Mnyika (Secretary General), and the resolute Godbless Lema, the party was going to navigate the murky waters of opposition politics in Tanzania in new ways. This was a challenge as CHADEMA had adopted a ‘No Reforms, No Election’ stance during the party’s convention in December 2024. It meant it would not contest the October 2025 general elections without prior significant electoral and political reforms (Minde, 2025). While one faction, allied to Mbowe, saw it as a pressure tactic for securing reforms, the other, allied to Lissu, was ready for an election boycott.

Lissu lifted the lid on the interpretation of the ‘No Reforms, No Election’ slogan while addressing party aspirants on 3 April. His speech, which we title “Tutakinukisha (Ignite it): ‘No Reform, No Election’”, was a programmatic declaration, rhetorical escalation and deliberate move to reframe CHADEMA and Tanzania’s political struggle as a question of liberation rather than (electoral) competition.

A few days later, on 9 April 2025, Lissu was arrested in Mbinga, a town in southern Tanzania, while addressing supporters. He was driven overnight to Dar es Salaam and, on 10 April 2025, was formally charged at the Kisutu Resident Magistrate’s Court on two counts: treason and publication of false information. The prosecution’s charge sheet pointed to the speech Lissu delivered on 3 April 2025, in which the state (prosecution) alleged called for the obstruction of the 2025 general election.

While acknowledging the state’s legal interpretation of Lissu’s speech, our objective is to adopt a close reading of it and provide keys to understanding its utterance, meaning and significance. Lissu’s speech is a situated political event that combines historical narrations, personal sacrifice, political morality, and strategic ambiguity. It can be approached as simultaneously a performative act and a materiality act (Barber, 2007) for the sake of rhetorical effects. The link between the text and personhood is also a crucial element of the speech: Lissu’s biography—such as past persecution, potential arrest, and renunciation of electoral ambitions—is woven into the fabric of the speech, shaping the political subject within the text itself. Authority is thus produced through the alignment of speech, personal history, and anticipated audience reception.

Tutakinukisha (Ignite it): ‘No Reform, no Election’”

This speech by Tundu Lissu is available on YouTube, 11 May 2025: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KkIZj15NurU

They have said one correct thing here.

They say that this position [“No reforms, no election”] amounts to rebellion. That is true. It is true.

By “They”, Lissu refers to CCM politicians and supporters. When Samia Suluhu Hassan became the President of the United Republic of Tanzania in 2021, following John Magufuli’s death, she initiated several reforms and reversed most of her predecessor’s policies. However, these reforms were deemed cosmetic and not anchored on institutional or constitutional reforms. Periodically, as the country approached the 2025 October elections, most of these reforms were reversed and state repression increased.

Because when we say we will block the election, we are saying we will mobilize resistance.

That is how change is achieved, [Applause]

That is how change has always been achieved.

CHADEMA rejects Tanzania’s electoral authoritarianism—a system in which elections are held but conducted under authoritarian conditions (see Schedler, 2006; Levitksy & Way, 2012; Riedl, 2014). Despite holding regular multiparty elections, competitive authoritarianism is the rule in Tanzania (Morse, 2014), marked by limited opposition participation, media restrictions, and curtailed civic and political rights. CHADEMA, for example, cites the 2019 local government elections, which were overwhelmingly won by the ruling CCM, the 2020 general elections, in which the incumbent Magufuli won by 85%, and the 2024 local government polls. In all these elections, the opposition was systematically silenced by either the disqualification of candidates, the arbitrary arrests of key opposition figures, or police harassment. Under these conditions, elections are not seen as neutral democratic mechanisms but as instruments that can be rendered illegitimate by structural unfairness.

Nelson Mandela had to endure 27 years in prison, convicted of treason, in order to bring about change in South Africa.

Lissu’s reference to Nelson Mandela buttresses his point that he is ready to go to prison in the struggle for liberating Tanzania from competitive authoritarianism. His speech can be compared to Mandela’s address at the Rivonia Trial on 20 April 1964, in which the South African leader declared his readiness to die for the struggle of the South African people (Mandela, 1964). Later in his speech (see below), Lissu evokes other central African leaders of liberation struggles who were imprisoned during the fight against colonialism, citing Kenneth Kaunda, Robert Mugabe, Sam Nujoma and Jomo Kenyatta.

So, we, too, are going to ignite [‘kukinukisha’ in the Kiswahili original version] this struggle. [Applause]

During the High Court session of 8 October 2025, Lissu, who had hitherto taken up the task of self-representation, interrogates one state witness on the meaning of kukinukisha. Lissu derives the term kukinukisha from the Kiswahili verb kunuka which connotes smell and kunukia which means to smell nice. Here, Lissu is not simply forecasting an action; he is performing a commitment, positioning both himself and his audience within a newly constituted political situation.

We will go with those who are ready. No one will have a gun put to their head. We will move forward with those who are prepared.

Those who believe that CCM will suddenly become born-again democrats—that they have changed—we wish them well.
We are not people of ill will.

But if you want to be a Member of Parliament and speak the truth, then we must fight for change.
Let us fight for change, my brothers and sisters.

Lissu’s repeated inclusive appeals, ‘my brothers and sisters’ (ndugu zangu in Kiswahili), and direct second-person commands, such as ‘Do not be afraid’ (msiogope), foster a moral and political collective defined more by shared willingness to take a long-term political risk of not participating in an election if there are no significant reforms. Speeches are to be viewed as social actions that actively create publics, authorial personas, and interpretive fields, rather than as passive conveyors of meaning (Bauman, 1985; Barber, 2007). Lissu’s speech isn’t just aimed at an existing audience: it calls a public into existence.

What exactly will be destroyed?

Will the country collapse?

At worst, we will disrupt this election.

If you are thinking of becoming an MP in October or November, forget it. That is the truth.

I myself once thought about the presidency. I was a presidential aspirant. I have abandoned that idea.

If you were thinking of becoming a councillor in November, forget it as well.

Because we are going to ignite this struggle seriously [‘Peoples, Peoples’ chants].

Yes, we will suffer—that is true.

But I believe we will win.

Why?

If we push this struggle seriously, what will they do?

Will they kill us? Can they?

So, I ignite the struggle and I am arrested. I am arrested.

Where do they take me?

I am charged with treason, with inciting rebellion.

But in liberation politics—and I am not talking about opportunistic or transactional politics [The audience chants, ‘Peoples, Peoples, Power’—CHADEMA’s rallying call]

In liberation politics, being arrested and charged is like being crowned with a golden crown, Alright?

By invoking liberation politics’, Lissu positions CHADEMA not as a competing party within a system, but as a movement contesting the system itself. Lissu’s use of the term ‘rebellion’ throughout his speech is deliberate. Under Tanzanian law, ‘incitement’ and ‘rebellion’ are charges that have historically been used against dissidents. Lissu strategically neutralises the stigmatic power of this word and reframes it as a moral question.

Let me explain.

Julius Nyerere [Pause]. Many of us do not know our own history.

Who was the first Tanganyikan to be convicted of sedition?

[The audience responds] It was Nyerere.

CCM has historically hoarded and used the collective memory of Julius Nyerere and his epitaphs to hegemonically reproduce narratives of dominance or perform dominance and political morality (Fouéré, 2015; Minde, 2021). The opposition may use the same strategy to deconstruct CCM’s hegemonic references and reappropriate the figure of Nyerere in its own way (Kwayu, 2015).

In 1958, Julius Nyerere was convicted of sedition, together with Robert Makange and Rashid Kheri Baghdelee, editors of Mwafrika newspaper, who later became a Member of Parliament. That case elevated Nyerere beyond measure.

He was sentenced to six months in prison or fined 300 shillings—a very large sum in 1958.

Lissu invokes Nyerere’s pre-independence sedition case, which consolidated Nyerere’s legacy of liberation. In 1958, Nyerere, as leader of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), was charged with criminal libel or seditious libel by the British colonial administration. The case is often referred to as kesi ya uchochezi in Tanzania. Two editors of the Mwafrika newspaper, Kheri Rashid Baghdellah and Robert Makange, were also charged with sedition by the colonial administration. In the official charge sheet, Nyerere was accused of slander (kukashifu) of colonial District Commissioner Weeks of Musoma in his contribution to the TANU newspaper, secondly, slandering DC Scott of Songea, and thirdly, jointly charged for slandering the two officials (Ngh’waya, 1990). By highlighting that Nyerere was convicted of sedition, Lissu reappropriates the figure of Nyerere, who defied and ‘mocked’ colonial administrators and later became the country’s first independence leader.

And if you look across our region, which liberation leader did not go to prison?

[Kenneth] Kaunda went to prison.

[Robert] Mugabe went to prison.

[Sam] Nujoma went to prison.

[Jomo] Kenyatta went to prison—for nine years.

When Kenyatta was released, he went straight to Lancaster House to negotiate independence.

Performative speech acquires force not through originality, but through citation of authoritative forms. Lissu’s repeated invocation of Mandela, Nyerere, and other liberation figures functions as a citational chain, anchoring his words in a historically sanctioned grammar of resistance. The power of the speech comes not from legal authority but from its connection to a shared history of liberation struggle. In this sense, the speech does not merely advocate rebellion; it re-performs rebellion and other social performances, such as race, colour, and nationhood, as recognisable political forms.

So, when you tell us this is treason, this is rebellion, and therefore we will be imprisoned—so be it.

Yes, it is rebellion. That is the path to freedom.

Lissu, who has borne the brunt of state repression in the past, reframes imprisonment, not as an act of oppression but a rite of passage. In 2017, he survived an assassination attempt while serving as a Member of Parliament. He attributes this attempted assassination to his lifelong efforts to expose government corruption and advocate for democracy and human rights. While not explicitly mentioning his predecessor, Freeman Mbowe, who was also arrested and charged with terrorism, Lissu portrays CHADEMA’s direction as supporting the liberation narrative. Only by rebelling current state authoritarianism can one bring about new models of state governance.

We may delay parliamentary ambitions for a time.

But we will secure reforms that will send far more of us into parliament in the future.

Some people want us to accept five percent of the vote, win seven MPs, and then fight among ourselves over special seats.

I want us to win many more votes—and we have the capacity to do so—so that everyone who seeks representation can have a real chance.

Special seats will come with reforms, not with this broken system.

And we will have many more constituency MPs.

And we will have a president.

Yes, this is a difficult road.

But no political party in this country has ever spoken this language before.

We are the first.

So, honourable leaders, prepare yourselves. We will win.

Do not be afraid. Do not be afraid. Do not be afraid.

That is all from me, brothers and sisters.

I have just returned from a tour of the Nyasa zone, and tomorrow we head south.\

Honourable Mayala, tomorrow we are coming to your area.

In Nyasa, I saw our regional leadership and our members.

The people I met there are militant in a way you have rarely seen.

Aden Mayala was CHADEMA’s chairman of the Southern region before he defected to CCM just before the general elections of October 2025. Nyasa, a region in Southern Tanzania that CHADEMA foregrounds as a political laboratory, serves as empirical grounding: militancy is presented not as elite invention but as grassroots sentiment. This echoes revolutionary rhetoric that claims to discover rather than create popular anger.

Some say the party will die if we do not participate in the election.

Those people have forgotten how to practice people-centred politics.

Lissu rejects claims that CHADEMA would “die” without participating in elections, emphasizing that political legitimacy should be based on people-centred politics—which is the party’s central ideology (‘People Power’) instead of elite networks. He contrasts the focus on popular welfare with an elite political economy characterized by resource grab, extractive projects (such as mining), patronage and widespread corruption. In this populist framing, participating in elections without implementing reforms is portrayed as endorsing predatory governance rather than promoting collective interests in progress.

The members I spent eight days with in Nyasa are ready.

If that spirit exists everywhere—as I believe it does—then let us struggle, and we will achieve change. Let us struggle, and we will achieve change.

Our people need to be prepared; they need to be led by courageous leaders.

Let us not go with this idea of “you touch and retreat, you touch and retreat.”

That is not the way forward. Is that clear?

Thank you very much, especially to the people of Nyasa.

 

This series of Mambo! focuses on the 2025 election year in Tanzania. It offers an original format for a close reading of politically-related empirical objects linked to this eventful election year, marked by a shift toward massive state violence. In each episode, the selected object is reproduced in its original form and translated where necessary, carefully contextualized and closely annotated or commented with the aim of providing keys to understanding its production, meaning and significance. These objects constitute relevant sources or documents for analysing the openly brutal authoritarian turn taken by the Tanzanian regime during this electoral sequence at the end of 2025.

References

Barber, K. (2007). The anthropology of texts, persons and publics. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511619656

Bauman, R. (1975). Verbal art as performance. American Anthropologist, 77(2), 290–311. https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.1975.77.2.02a00030

Fouéré, M.-A. (2015). “Julius Nyerere”: The man, the word, and the order of discourse. In M.-A. Fouéré (Ed.), Remembering Nyerere in Tanzania: History, memory, legacy (pp. 3–32). Mkuki na Nyota/Africae. http://books.openedition.org/africae/703

Kwayu, A. C. (2016). Different “uses of Nyerere” in the constitutional review debates: a touchstone for legitimacy in Tanzania. In M.-A. Fouéré (Ed.), Remembering Nyerere in Tanzania: History, Memory, Legacy (pp. 128–140). Mkuki na Nyota/Africae. https://books.openedition.org/africae/758

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2012). Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511781353

Makulilo, A. (2008). Tanzania: a de facto one party state? VDM Verlag.

Mandela, N. (1964, April 20). “I am prepared to die” [Comment on “Statement by Nelson Mandela from the dock at the opening of the defence case in the Rivonia Trial, Pretoria Supreme Court – Pretoria”]. http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/before/640420_trial.htm

Minde, N. (2021). The endurance of one-party dominance: the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and the challenge of democratizing the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union. [PhD Dissertation]. United States International University-Africa.

Minde, N. (2024, October 18). Who is Tundu Lissu? Tanzania’s opposition leader is fighting for change in the face of fresh attacks on political freedoms. The Conversation. https://doi.org/10.64628/aaj.h3yq949hs

Minde, N. (2025). Stifling democracy in Tanzania: Scenarios for the 2025 elections. In ISS Africa (Policy Brief No. 206). https://issafrica.org/research/policy-briefs/stifling-democracy-in-tanzania-scenarios-for-the-2025-elections

Morse, Y. L. (2013). Party matters: the institutional origins of competitive hegemony in Tanzania. Democratization, 21(4), 655–677. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.764285

Ngh’waya, S. (1990). Kesi ya Julius Kambarage Nyerere 1958. Tanzania Publishing House.

Paget, D. (2018). The authoritarian origins of well-organized opposition parties: The rise of Chadema in Tanzania. African Affairs, 118(473), 692–711. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady061

Riedl, R. B. (2014). Authoritarian origins of democratic party systems in Africa. Cambridge University Press.

Schedler, A. (2006). Electoral authoritarianism: The dynamics of unfree competition. L. Rienner Publishers.


OpenEdition vous propose de citer ce billet de la manière suivante :
Nicodemus Minde, Marie-Aude Fouéré (25 février 2026). Episode #1. Tundu Lissu’s “Tutakinukisha (Ignite it): ‘No Reform, no Election’” Speech of 3 April 2025. Mambo ! Consulté le 9 mai 2026 à l’adresse https://doi.org/10.58079/15rkb


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